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Abstract. This paper shows that the power law property of the firm size distribu-
tion is a robust prediction of the standard entry-exit model of firm dynamics. Only
one variation is required: the usual restriction that firm productivity lies below an
ad hoc upper bound is dropped. We prove that, after this small modification, the
Pareto tail of the distribution is predicted under a wide and empirically plausible
class of specifications for firm-level productivity growth. We also provide neces-
sary and sufficient conditions under which the entry-exit model exhibits a unique
stationary recursive equilibrium in the setting where firm size is unbounded.
JEL Classifications: L11, D21
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1. Introduction
The right-hand tail of the firm size distribution closely resembles a power law.1
This property is highly significant for a range of aggregate outcomes. For example,
Carvalho and Grassi (2019) used a calibrated model of industry dynamics to show
that idiosyncratic firm-level shocks generate substantial aggregate volatility when the
firm size distribution has the power law property (also referred to as a Pareto tail or
Financial support from ARC grant FT160100423 and Alfred P. Sloan Foundation grant G-2016-
7052 is gratefully acknowledged.
1In other words, for some measure of firm size S, there are positive constants C and α such that
P{S > s} ≈ Cs−α for large s. A well known reference is Axtell (2001). The power law finding
has been replicated in many studies. See, for example, Gaffeo et al. (2003), who treats the G7
economies, as well as Cirillo and Hüsler (2009), Kang et al. (2011) and Zhang et al. (2009), who use
Italian, Korean and Chinese data respectively.
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2fat tail). Aggregate volatility is generated because, with such heavy tails, the volatil-
ity contained in averages over independent shocks remains substantial even when the
number of draws is large. Their work builds on Nirei (2006) and Gabaix (2011), who
previously showed that idiosyncratic firm-level volatility can account for a substantial
fraction of aggregate volatility when shocks have heavy tails.
As well as volatility, the properties of the right tail of the firm size distribution also
affect the both the wealth distribution and the income distribution, and hence the
concentration of income and wealth, due to the high concentration of firm ownership
and entrepreneurial equity.2 The income and wealth distributions in turn affect many
other economic phenomena, including the composition of aggregate demand and the
growth rate of aggregate productivity.3
One related issue concerning heavy tails is that, for such distributions, averages and
nonparametric statistics provide relatively little guidance on likely future outcomes,
even when sample sizes are large.4 Thus, data arising from such distributions must
be supplemented by theory in order to make quantitative statements with any rea-
sonable degree of accuracy. In other words, to accurately predict the time path of the
aggregate variables discussed above under different policy settings or other economic
scenarios, it is necessary to construct models that contain within them a prediction
for the right-hand tail of the firm size distribution.
Occam’s razor recommends reproducing the tail of the firm size distribution from the
simplest model possible, conditional on realistic assumptions and internal consistency.
A natural candidate for this purpose is the entry-exit model of Hopenhayn (1992),
which forms one of the cornerstones of quantitative economics and has been successful
in replicating several other key aspects of the firm size distribution. This leads to
the question posed in the present study: Does the benchmark Hopenhayn (1992)
model reproduce the Pareto tail (i.e., power law) of the distribution as an equilibrium
prediction under realistic assumptions on firm-level productivity growth?
2See, for example, Benhabib and Bisin (2018). The impact of capital income on income and wealth
dispersion has risen in recent years, as documented and analyzed in Kacperczyk et al. (2018).
3The literature on the connection between of the distribution of income and wealth and growth
rates is extensive. A recent example combining theory and empirics is Halter et al. (2014).
4As one illustrative example, if observations are iid draws from the Cauchy distribution, then
the sample mean is likewise Cauchy distributed. In particular, the amount of information that it
contains about the underlying distribution shows no increase with sample size. Adler et al. (1998)
discuss statistical methods in the presence of heavy tails.
3The issue of what constitutes “realistic” firm-level productivity growth is critical here,
since the exogenously specific dynamics for idiosyncratic firm-level productivity play
a key role in shaping aggregate outcomes in the entry–exit model. A commonly used
baseline for modeling firm growth is Gibrat’s law, which postulates that growth is
stationary, with mean and volatility of the growth rate both invariant to firm size.
However, this baseline is not itself realistic, as a long series of empirical studies have
shown that firm growth deviates from Gibrat’s law in systematic ways. For example,
small firms typically grow faster than large firms.5 A second deviation is that the
growth rate of small firms is more volatile than that of large firms.6 Any realistic
specification of firm dynamics must admit these departures from Gibrat’s law.
This paper takes a theoretical approach to the problems raised above. We analyze a
setting that admits a broad range of specifications of firm-level dynamics, including
those with the systematic departures from Gibrat’s law. For example, small firms can
grow faster than large firms and their growth rates can exhibit greater volatility. In
this setting we prove that when any of these firm-level dynamics are inserted into the
standard Hopenhayn (1992) model, the endogenous firm size distribution generated
by entry and exit exhibits a Pareto tail. Moreover, this result does not depend on the
shape of the entrants’ distribution, beyond a simple moment condition, or the demand
side of the market. In this sense, the Pareto tail becomes a highly robust prediction
of the standard entry-exit model once the state space is allowed to be unbounded.
We also show that the tail index, which determines the amount of mass in the right
tail of the distribution and has been the source of much empirical discussion (see, e.g.,
Axtell (2001) or Gabaix (2016)), depends only on the law of motion for incumbents.
As such, it is invariant to the productivity distribution for new entrants, the profit
functions of firms, and the structure of demand. For example, corporate tax policy
has no impact on the tail index of the firm size distribution (unless it affects the
growth rate of firm productivity).
The results described above are valid whenever the deviation between incumbents’
firm-level growth dynamics and Gibrat’s law is not infinitely large, in the sense of
5Some of the many studies showing faster firm growth for small firms are Evans (1987b), Evans
(1987a) and Hall (1987).
6Studies showing this relationship include Hymer and Pashigian (1962) and Dunne et al. (1989).
More references with similar findings and an overview of the literature can be found in Santarelli et al.
(2006).
4expected absolute value. Although this restriction is surprisingly weak, it tends to
bind more for large firms than for small ones, since large firms have greater weight
in the integral that determines expected value. This restriction is consistent with the
data, since large firms tend to conform more to Gibrat’s law than do small ones (see,
e.g., Evans (1987a), Evans (1987b) or Becchetti and Trovato (2002)). It also provides
intuition behind our results, since large firms matter more for the properties of the tail
of the firm size distribution. The machinery employed to prove these results draws on
Goldie (1991), which uses implicit renewal theory to analyze Pareto tails of a range
of time-invariant probability laws.
In addition to the contribution described above, the extension of the standard Hopenhayn
(1992) model to an unbounded state space provided in this paper has independent
value, since, as noted above, appropriate theoretical structure is necessary for quanti-
tative analysis in the presence of heavy tails. This extension to the model is nontrivial
in three ways. First, the lifetime profits of firms are potentially unbounded, requiring
a modified approach to the firm decision problem. Second, the time invariance condi-
tion for the equilibrium measure of firms concerns stationary distributions of Markov
transitions that are possibly transient, due to the unboundedness of productivity.
Third, aggregate output is potentially infinite, since integration across productivity
states is over an unbounded set.
We tackle the unbounded entry-exit model using a combination of weighted supre-
mum norms for the firm decision problem and Kac’s Theorem plus a drift condition to
handle productivity dynamics. Through this combination, we provide an exact nec-
essary and sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of a stationary recursive
equilibrium in the unbounded setting, as well as a decomposition of the equilibrium
firm size distribution and sample path interpretation via Pitman’s occupation mea-
sure. The latter connects the cross-sectional mass of firms in a given region of the
distribution with the occupation times of individual firms. The proof of existence of
a stationary recursive equilibrium is constructive, so quantitative tractability of the
entry-exit model is preserved.7
7The drift condition that we use to handle productivity dynamics has some independent interest.
Drift conditions are a well-known technique for controlling Markov processes on unbounded state
spaces (see, e.g., Meyn and Tweedie (2012)). The idea is to obtain a Lyapunov function (sometimes
called a Foster–Lyapunov function in the Markov setting) on the state space, which is defined by
two properties: One is that the function becomes large as the state diverges. The second is that the
5This paper builds on previous studies that have linked random firm-level growth
within an industry to Pareto tails in the cross-sectional distribution of firm size.
Early examples include Champernowne (1953) and Simon (1955), who showed that
Pareto tails in stationary distributions can arise if time series follow Gibrat’s law
along with a reflecting lower barrier. Since then it has been well understood that
Gibrat’s law can generate Pareto tails for the firm size distribution in models where
firm dynamics are exogenously specified. Surveys can be found in Gabaix (2008) and
Gabaix (2016).
Córdoba (2008) points out that Gibrat’s law is not supported by the data on firm
growth and considers a generalization where volatility can depend on firm size. He
then shows that Pareto tails still arise in a discrete state setting under such dynam-
ics. This paper strengthens his result in two ways. First, the firm size distribution is
endogenously determined as the equilibrium outcome of an entry-exit model, allow-
ing us to consider how regulations, policies and demand impact on the distribution.
Second, we allow other departures from Gibrat’s law supported by the data, such as
dependence of the mean growth rate on firm size.
More recently, Carvalho and Grassi (2019) produce a Pareto tail in a model of en-
dogenous entry and exit whenever Gibrat’s law holds for incumbent dynamics and
new entrants draw their productivity from a Pareto distribution. While we make no
contribution to their discussion of aggregate fluctuations, this paper enhances their
power law finding by allowing for a more plausible range of firm-level growth spec-
ifications, while at the same time showing that the key results are invariant to the
productivity distribution of new entrants. We also work with an unbounded state
space, which allows direct modeling of the Pareto tail of the firm size distribution.
There are a several studies not previously mentioned that generate Pareto tails for
the firm size distribution using a number of alternative mechanisms. A classic exam-
ple is Lucas (1978), which connects heterogeneity in managerial talent to a Pareto
law. More recent examples include Luttmer (2011), Acemoglu and Cao (2015) and
Cao et al. (2018). This paper does not attempt to distinguish between these models
based on observed outcomes or question their significance. Rather, the objective of
value assigned to the state by the Lyapunov function under the Markov process in question tends
to decrease if the state variable begins to diverge. The main difficulty with the approach is funding
a suitable Lyapunov function. The innovation introduced below is to use firm output itself as the
Lyapunov function.
6this paper is to determine whether or not Pareto-tailed distributions are a robust
prediction of the benchmark entry-exit model under realistic firm-level dynamics, as
well as to remove tail truncation from that model to improve quantitative analysis.8
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the model.
Section 3 shows existence of a unique stationary recursive equilibrium when the state
space is unbounded. Section 4 investigates heavy tails and Section 5 concludes. Long
proofs are deferred to the appendix.
2. Entry and Exit
The structure of the model follows Hopenhayn (1992). There is a single good produced
by a continuum of firms, consisting at each point in time of a mixture of new entrants
and incumbents. The good is sold at price p and the demand is given by D(p).
Assumption 2.1. The demand function D is continuous and strictly decreasing with
D(0) = ∞ and limp→∞D(p) = 0.
Firms facing output price p and having firm-specific productivity ϕ generate profits
π(ϕ, p) and produce output q(ϕ, p). (We take q and π as given but provide examples
below where they are derived from profit maximization problems.) Profits are negative
on the boundary due to fixed costs, as in Hopenhayn (1992). In particular,
Assumption 2.2. Both π and q are continuous and strictly increasing on R2+. The
function q is nonnegative while π satisfies π(ϕ, p) < 0 if either ϕ = 0 or p = 0.
Productivity of each incumbent firm updates according to the idiosyncratic Markov
state process Γ(ϕ, dϕ′), where Γ is a transition probability kernel on R+. The outside
option for firms is zero and the value v(ϕ, p) of of an incumbent satisfies
v(ϕ, p) = π(ϕ, p) + βmax
{
0,
∫
v(ϕ′, p)Γ(ϕ, dϕ′)
}
, (1)
where β = 1/(1 + r) for some fixed r > 0. Here and below, integrals are over R+.
8Also tangentially related to our study, at least on a technical level, is Benhabib et al. (2015),
which studies a nonlinear process associated with optimal household savings that approximates a
Kesten process when income is large. This is somewhat analogous to our treatment of the firm size
distribution, in that we allow nonlinear firm-level dynamics that approximate Gibrat’s law. However,
the topic and underlying methodology are substantially different.
7Assumption 2.3. The productivity kernel Γ is monotone increasing. In addition,
(a) For each a > 0 and ϕ > 0, there is an n ∈ N such that Γn(ϕ, [0, a)) > 0.
(b) For each p > 0, there exists a ϕ > 0 such that
∫
π(ϕ′, p)Γ(ϕ, dϕ′) > 0.
The symbol Γn denotes the n-step transition kernel. The monotonicity assumption
means that Γ(ϕ, [0, a]) is decreasing in ϕ for all a > 0. Condition (a) is analogous
to the recurrence condition in Hopenhayn (1992). Condition (b) ensures that not all
incumbents exit every period.
New entrants draw productivity independently from a fixed probability distribution
γ and enter the market if
∫
v(ϕ′, p) γ(dϕ′) > ce, where ce > 0 is a fixed cost of entry.
Assumption 2.4. The distribution γ satisfies
∫
q(ϕ, p)γ(dϕ) <∞ and puts positive
mass on the interval [0, a] for all a > 0.
The first condition in Assumption 2.4 is a regularity condition that helps to ensure
finite output. The second condition is convenient because it leads to aperiodicity of
the endogenous productivity process.
Assumption 2.5. There exists a p > 0 such that
∫
π(ϕ, p) γ(dϕ) > ce.
Assumption 2.5 ensures that entry occurs when the price is sufficiently large. It is
relatively trivial because, for price taking firms, revenue is proportional to price.
For realistic industry dynamics, we also need a nonzero rate of exit. We implement
this by assuming that, when a firm’s current productivity is sufficiently low, its ex-
pected lifetime profits are negative:
Assumption 2.6. The profit function is such that
∑
t>0 β
t
∫
π(ϕ′, p)Γt(0, dϕ′) 6 0.
One (admittedly simplistic) example of a setting where Assumption 2.6 holds is when
firm growth follows Gibrat’s law, so that Γ is represented by the recursion ϕt+1 =
At+1ϕt for some positive iid sequence {At}. Then ϕ0 = 0 implies ϕt = 0 for all t,
and hence Γt(0, dϕ′) is a point mass at zero. Hence the integral in Assumption 2.6
evaluates to π(0, p) for each t, which is negative by Assumption 2.2.
Since productivity is unbounded and profits can be arbitrarily large, we also need a
condition on the primitives to ensure that v is finite. In stating it, we consider the
8productivity process {ϕt} defined by
ϕ0 ∼ γ and ϕt+1 ∼ Γ(ϕt, dϕ′) when t > 1. (2)
Assumption 2.7. There is a δ ∈ (β, 1) with
∑
t>0 δ
t
E π(ϕt, p) <∞ at all p > 0.
While slightly stricter than a direct bound on lifetime profits, Assumption 2.7 has
the benefit of yielding a contraction result for the Bellman operator corresponding
to the Bellman equation (1). Since we are working in a setting where profits can be
arbitrarily large, the value function is unbounded, so the contraction in question must
be with respect to a weighted supremum norm. To construct this norm, we take δ as
in Assumption 2.7 and let
κ(ϕ, p) :=
∑
t>0
δtEϕπˆ(ϕt, p) with πˆ := π + b. (3)
Here b is a constant chosen such that π + b > 1. The function κ is constructed so
that it dominates the value function and satisfies 1 6 κ <∞ at all points in the state
space.9 For each scalar-valued f on R2+, let ‖f‖κ := sup |f/κ|. This is the κ-weighted
supremum norm. If it is finite for f then we say that f is κ-bounded. Let
C := all continuous, increasing and κ-bounded functions on R2+.
Under the distance d(v, w) := ‖w − v‖κ, the set C is a complete metric space.10
Assumption 2.8. If u is in C , then (ϕ, p) 7→
∫
u(ϕ′, p)Γ(ϕ, dϕ′) is continuous.
Assumption 2.8 is a version of the continuity property imposed by Hopenhayn (1992),
modified slightly to accommodate the fact that Γ acts on unbounded functions.
3. Stationary Recursive Equilibrium
Now we turn to existence, uniqueness and computation of stationary recursive equi-
libria for the industry. All the assumptions of the previous section are in force.
9To be more precise, ϕ 7→ κ(ϕ, p) is finite γ-almost everywhere by Assumption 2.7. If γ is
supported on all of R+, then, since the function in question is monotone, this implies that κ is
finite everywhere. If not, then we tighten the assumptions above by requiring that κ(ϕ, p) is finite
everywhere.
10Completeness of the set of continuous κ-bounded functions under d is proved in many places,
including Hernández-Lerma and Lasserre (2012), §7.2. Our claim of completeness of (C , d) follows
from the fact that the limit of a sequence of increasing functions in (C , d) is also increasing.
93.1. Existence and Uniqueness. We begin our analysis with the firm decision
problem:
Lemma 3.1. The Bellman operator T : C → C defined at v ∈ C by
(Tv)(ϕ, p) = π(ϕ, p) + βmax
{
0,
∫
v(ϕ′, p)Γ(ϕ, dϕ′)
}
(4)
is a contraction on (C , d). Its unique fixed point v∗ is strictly increasing and strictly
negative if either ϕ = 0 or p = 0.
Now let ϕ¯ be the function on R+ defined by
ϕ¯(p) := min
{
ϕ > 0
∣∣ ∫ v∗(ϕ′, p) Γ(ϕ, dϕ′) > 0
}
. (5)
With the convention that incumbents who are indifferent remain rather than exit, an
incumbent with productivity ϕ exits if and only if ϕ < ϕ¯(p). In (5) we take the usual
convention that min ∅ =∞.
Lemma 3.2. The optimal exit threshold function ϕ¯ satisfies ϕ¯(0) =∞ and is finite,
strictly positive and decreasing on (0,∞).
The equilibrium entry condition is
∫
v∗(ϕ, p)γ(dϕ) 6 ce and, whenever the mass of
entrants M is strictly positive, ∫
v∗(ϕ, p) γ(dϕ) = ce. (6)
Lemma 3.3. There exists a unique price p∗ > 0 such that (6) holds.
For stationarity, the measure µ of current firm productivity levels must satisfy the
invariance condition
µ(B) =
∫
Γ(ϕ,B)1{ϕ > ϕ¯(p)}µ(dϕ) +M γ(B) for all B ∈ B, (7)
where B is all Borel sets on R+ and ϕ¯ is as in (5). Stationarity also requires balanced
entry and exit, which mean that M = µ{ϕ < ϕ¯(p)}. In particular, a stationary
recursive equilibrium for this model is a positive constant p, a finite Borel measure
µ on R+ and an M > 0 such that when p is the output price, µ is the distribution
of firms, and M is the mass of firms that enter in each period, the equilibrium entry
10
condition holds, the time-invariance condition (13) is valid, there is balanced entry
and exit, and the goods market clears:∫
q(ϕ, p)µ(dϕ) = D(p). (8)
We can now state our main existence and uniqueness result. In stating it, we we take
{ϕt} to be as in (2) and set τ(p) to be the lifespan of a firm with this productivity
path when output price is p:
τ(p) := inf{t > 1 : ϕt < ϕ¯(p)}. (9)
Expected lifetime firm output at p is
ℓ(p) := E
τ(p)∑
t=1
q(ϕt, p).
Let p∗ be the unique price consistent with the entry condition (see Lemma 3.3). The
next theorem characterizes equilibrium for the entry-exit model set out in Section 2.
Theorem 3.4. The following two statements are logically equivalent:
(a) Expected lifetime output for firms is finite.
(b) A stationary recursive equilibrium exists.
If either and hence both of these statements is true, then the equilibrium is unique, the
equilibrium mass of entrantsM∗ is strictly positive, and the distribution of productivity
µ∗ and M∗ satisfy
µ∗(B) = M∗ ·E
τ(p∗)∑
t=1
1{ϕt ∈ B} for all B ∈ B. (10)
Condition (a) in Theorem 3.4 requires ℓ(p∗) < ∞. While p∗ is not a primitive, a
simple sufficient condition involving only primitives is given in Section 3.2.
The decomposition (10) says that the mass of firms in set B is proportional to the
expected number of times that a firm’s productivity visits B over its lifespan. It ties
the cross-sectional distribution of productivity to dynamics at the level of the firm.
The decomposition is obtained by a combination of Kac’s Theorem and the Pitman
occupation formula. The proof of Theorem 3.4 is constructive and the basic approach
and its numerical implementation are discussed in Section 3.3 below.11
11The traditional entry-exit model, with productivity bounded above by some constant B, is
a special case of Theorem 3.4. To see this, observe that q 6 K for some constant K in such a
11
3.2. A Sufficient Condition. We now give a simple sufficient condition for ℓ(p∗) <
∞, which in turn implies all of the conclusion of Theorem 3.4.
Assumption 3.1. For each p > 0, there exists an λ ∈ (0, 1) and L <∞ such that
∫
q(ϕ′, p)Γ(ϕ, dϕ′) 6 λq(ϕ, p) + L for all ϕ > 0. (11)
Assumption 3.1 says that output growth for incumbents is expected to be negative
whenever current output is sufficiently large.12 In the literature on Markov processes,
the bound in (11) is sometimes called a Foster–Lyapunov drift condition. In the
present case, output q is adopted as the Lyapunov function.
Proposition 3.5. If, in addition to the conditions in Section 2, Assumption 3.1
holds, then expected lifetime output for each firm is finite.
The intuition behind Proposition 3.5 is as follows. When Assumption 3.1 is in force,
incumbents with sufficiently large output tend to see output fall in the next period.
Output is a strictly increasing function of ϕ, so falling output means falling productiv-
ity. From this one can construct a finite interval such that, for any given incumbent,
productivity returns to this interval infinitely often. At each such occasion, the re-
currence condition in Assumption 2.3 yields an independent ε probability of exiting.
Eventually the firm exits and lifetime output remains finite.13
Example 3.1. Suppose that incumbent productivity grows according to
ϕt+1 = At+1ϕt + Yt+1 for some iid sequence {At, Yt}, (12)
setting, so ℓ(p∗) 6 KEτ(p∗). The expected firm lifespan Eτ(p) is finite at every p > 0, since,
by Assumption 2.3, there exists an integer n such that ε := Γn(B, [0, ϕ¯(p))) > 0, and hence {ϕt}
falls below ϕ¯(p) with independent probability at least ε every n periods. This means that Eτ(p) =∑
m∈NP{τ(p) > m} 6
∑
m∈N(1 − ε)
⌊m/n⌋, which is finite. Hence ℓ(p∗) is finite, and a stationary
recursive equilibrium exists.
12To see this, we can write q(ϕt, p) as Qt and express (11) as ln(EtQt+1/Qt) 6 ln(λ + L/Qt).
When Qt is sufficiently large, the right-hand side is negative.
13Even though lifetime output is finite along every sample path, this does not necessarily imply
that the expectation of lifetime output ℓ(p∗) is finite. Hence there are some subtleties involved in
the proof of Proposition 3.5. The reason that output is used as the Lyapunov function is that we
need this expectation to be finite. The appendix gives details.
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that production is linear in ϕ and that all factors of production are constant, so that
q(ϕ, p) = eϕ for some e > 0. Regarding the drift condition (11), we have∫
q(ϕ′, p)Γ(ϕ, dϕ′) = eEAt+1ϕ+EYt+1 = EAt+1q(ϕ, p) +EYt+1.
Assumption 3.1 is therefore satisfied whenever EAt < 1 and EYt <∞.
Example 3.2. Suppose instead that production is Cobb–Douglas, with output ϕnθ
under labor input n and parameter θ ∈ (0, 1). With profits given by pϕnθ − c− wn
for some c, w > 0, the function for output at optimal labor input is
q(ϕ, p) = ϕηm(p) where η :=
1
1− θ
and m(p) :=
(
pθ
w
)θ/(1−θ)
.
If productivity growth follows ϕt+1 = At+1ϕt, then the right-hand side of the drift
condition (11) becomes∫
q(ϕ′, p)Γ(ϕ, dϕ′) = E(At+1ϕ)
ηm(p) = EAηt+1q(ϕ, p).
Thus, Assumption 3.1 is valid whenever E[A1/(1−θ)t ] < 1. This is a joint restriction on
the rate of incumbent firm growth and the Cobb–Douglas production parameter θ.
3.3. Computing the Solution. When proving Theorem 3.4, our first step is to
insert balanced entry and exit into the time invariance condition, yielding
µ(B) =
∫
Πp(ϕ,B)µ(dϕ) for all B ∈ B, (13)
where Πp is the transition kernel on R+ defined by
Πp(ϕ,B) = Γ(ϕ,B)1{ϕ > ϕ¯(p)}+ 1{ϕ < ϕ¯(p)}γ(B). (14)
Then we proceed as follows:
(S1) Take the price p∗ dictated by the entry condition, as in Lemma 3.3.
(S2) Take µ to be the unique stationary Borel probability measure for Πp∗ .
(S3) Rescale by setting s := D(p∗)/
∫
q(ϕ, p∗)µ(dϕ) and then µ∗ := s µ.
Rescaling in (S3) is implemented so that the goods market clears. As shown in the
proof, uniqueness in (S2) always holds because Πp is irreducible for all p > 0. The
two challenging parts of the proof of Theorem 3.4 are existence of µ and positivity
of s. In both cases our solution draws on Kac’s Theorem. The proof in the appendix
gives details.
13
In terms of computational methods, the value p∗ in (S1) can be obtained once we
solve for v∗. The latter is a fixed point of a contraction map, as shown in Lemma 3.1.
This provides the basis of a globally convergent method of computation.
The situation for µ in (S2) is similar. It is shown in the appendix that the endogenous
productivity process is aperiodic and γ-irreducible. (See Meyn and Tweedie (2012)
for definitions and notation related to Markov processes.) The condition ℓ(p∗) < ∞
then implies that the same process is Harris recurrent and ergodic, opening avenues
for computing µ through either simulation or successive approximations.
Stronger statements are true when Assumption 3.1 holds. We show in the proof of
Proposition 3.5 that when Assumption 3.1 is in force, the transition kernel Πp is
V -uniformly ergodic (Meyn and Tweedie, 2012, Chapter 16) for all p > 0, implying
that the marginal distributions generated by Πp converge to its unique stationary
distribution at a geometric rate and yielding a range of sample path properties.14
4. Pareto Tails
Next we turn to the tail properties of the equilibrium distribution of firms identified by
Theorem 3.4. To be certain that this distribution exists, we impose the conditions of
Proposition 3.5. While we focus on productivity when analyzing firm size, heavy tails
in productivity is typically mirrored or accentuated in profit-maximizing output.15
It is convenient to introduce a function G and an iid sequence {Wt} such that
ϕt+1 = G(ϕt,Wt+1) (15)
obeys the incumbent dynamics embodied in the Markov kernel Γ.16 Such a repre-
sentation can always be constructed (see, e.g., Bhattacharya and Majumdar (2007)).
Let X be a random variable with distribution µ, where µ is the unique probability
14There is a caveat, however. As we show in the next section, the productivity distribution µ
and hence the firm size distribution µ∗ have very heavy tails for under realistic firm-level growth
dynamics. This adds a level of complication to numerics. Suitable methods for handling fat tails
numerically have been proposed by Gouin-Bonenfant and Toda (2019) in the context of the wealth
distribution and similar ideas should be applicable here.
15For example, in the Cobb–Douglas case studied in Example 3.2, profit-maximizing output is
convex in productivity.
16In other words, P{G(ϕ,Wt+1) ∈ B} = Γ(ϕ,B) for all ϕ > 0, B ∈ B.
14
measure identified in step (S2) of Section 3.3. The firm size distribution17 has a Pareto
tail with tail index α > 0 if there exists a C > 0 with
lim
x→∞
xαP{X > x} = C. (16)
In other words, the distribution is such that P{X > x} goes to zero like x−α. To
investigate when X has this property, we impose the following restriction on the law
of motion for incumbent firms. In stating it, we take W as a random variable with
the same distribution as each Wt.
Assumption 4.1. There exists an α > 0 and an independent random variable A
with continuous distribution function such that EAα = 1, the moments EAα+1 and∫
zαγ(dz) are both finite, and
E |G(X,W )α − (AX)α| <∞. (17)
Condition (17) bounds the deviation between the law of motion (15) for incumbent
productivity and Gibrat’s law, which is where productivity updates via ϕt+1 = At+1ϕt.
The existence of a positive α such that EAα = 1 requires that A puts at least some
probability mass above 1. In terms of Gibrat’s law ϕt+1 = At+1ϕt, this corresponds
to the natural assumption that incumbent firms grow with positive probability.
Theorem 4.1. If Assumption 4.1 holds for some α > 0, then the endogenous sta-
tionary distribution for firm productivity is Pareto-tailed, with tail index equal to α.
While Assumption 4.1 involves X, which is endogenous, we can obtain it from various
sufficient conditions that involve only primitives. For example, suppose there exist
independent nonnegative random variables A and Y such that
(P1) Y has finite moments of all orders,
(P2) A satisfies the conditions in Assumption 4.1 for some α ∈ (0, 2), and
(P3) the bound |G(ϕ,W )− Aϕ| 6 Y holds for all ϕ > 0.
We also assume that the first moment of γ is finite, although this is almost always
implied by Assumption 2.4 (see, e.g., Examples 3.1–3.2).
17In referring to this distribution, we ignore the distinction between the probability distribution
µ, from which X is drawn, and the equilibrium distribution µ∗ identified in step (S3) of Section 3.3,
since one is a rescaled version of the other and hence the tail properties are unchanged.
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Condition (P3) provides a connection between incumbent dynamics and Gibrat’s
law. Note that the dynamics in G can be nonlinear and, since Y is allowed to be
unbounded, infinitely large deviations from Gibrat’s law are permitted. One simple
specification satisfying (P3) is when G(ϕ,W ) = Aϕ + Y , which already replicates
some empirically relevant properties (e.g., small firms exhibit more volatile and faster
growth rates than large ones).
Conditions (P1)–(P3) only restrict incumbent dynamics (encapsulated by Γ in the
notation of Sections 2–3). Since, in Theorem 4.1, the tail index is determined by α,
these dynamics are the only primitive that influences the index on the Pareto tail.
The range of values for α in (P2) covers standard estimates (see, e.g., Gabaix (2016)).
To show that (P1)–(P3) imply the conditions of Assumption 4.1, we proceed as fol-
lows. As A satisfies the conditions of Assumption 4.1, we only need to check that
(17) holds. In doing so, we will make use of the elementary bound
|xa − ya| 6


|x− y|a if 0 < α 6 1;
α|x− y|max{x, y}a−1 if 1 < α
(18)
for nonnegative x, y. In the case 0 < α 6 1, we therefore have, by (P3),
|G(X,W )α − (AX)α| 6 |G(X,W )− (AX)|α 6 Y α.
But Y has finite moments of all orders by (P1), so the bound in (17) holds.
Next consider the case 1 < α < 2. Using (18) again, we have
|G(X,W )α − (AX)α| 6 α |G(X,W )− (AX)|max{G(X,W ), AX}α−1.
In view of (P3) above and the identity 2max{x, y} = |x− y|+ x+ y, we obtain
|G(X,W )α − (AX)α| 6 αY [Y +G(X,W ) + (AX)]α−1 .
Setting a := 1/(α − 1) and using Jensen’s inequality combined with the fact that
α < 2 now yields
E |G(X,W )α − (AX)α| 6 α
[
EY a+1 +EY aG(X,W ) +EY a(AX)
]α−1
.
We need to bound the three expectations on the right hand side. In doing so we use
Lemma A.6 in the appendix, which shows that EX <∞ when 1 < α < 2.
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The first expectations is finite by (P1). The third is finite by (P1) and independence
of Y , A and X.18 For the second, since Y is independent of X and W , finiteness of
the expectation reduces to finiteness of EG(X,W ). We have
G(X,W ) = G(X,W )1{X < ϕ¯(p∗)}+G(X,W )1{X > ϕ¯(p∗)}.
Taking expectations and observing that, given X > ϕ¯(p∗), the random variable
G(X,W ) has distribution Πp∗(X, dϕ′), we have
EG(X,W ) 6
∫
zγ(dz) +
∫ ∫
ϕ′Πp∗(ϕ, dϕ
′)µ(dϕ) =
∫
zγ(dz) +
∫
ϕµ(dϕ).
The equality on the right is due to stationarity of µ under the endogenous law of
motion for firm productivity. Since
∫
zγ(dz) is finite by assumption and
∫
ϕµ(dϕ) =
EX, which is finite as stated above, we conclude that under (P1)–(P3), the conditions
of Theorem 4.1 are satisfied.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we investigated properties of the firm size distribution in the entry-
exit model of Hopenhayn (1992). We removed the upper bound on firm productivity,
imposed previously in order to simplify analysis, allowing us to consider more realistic
representations of firm growth. We found that the standard entry-exit model provides
a direct and robust theory of the power law in firm size under realistic firm-level
growth dynamics. Substantial and empirically relevant deviations from Gibrat’s law
were accommodated without altering these results.
The methodology developed in this paper can potentially be applied to other settings
where a power law is observed. For example, the wealth distribution is Pareto tailed,
while the rate of return on wealth (and hence the growth rate of wealth) has been
found to vary with the level of wealth in systematic ways (see, e.g., Fagereng et al.
(2016)). Similarly, the distribution of city sizes tends to a Pareto tail. At the same
time, Gibrat’s law fails in this setting too (see, e.g., Córdoba (2008)). Such topics are
left to future work.
18Note that EAα = 1 and, in the present case, we have 1 < α < 2, so finiteness of EA is assured.
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Appendix A. Proofs
In the proofs we use the operator notation
(Γu)(ϕ, p) :=
∫
u(ϕ′, p)Γ(ϕ, dϕ′) for each u ∈ C ,
while P denotes the Borel probability measures on R+. The symbol  means first
order stochastic dominance. All notation and terminology associated with Markov
models follows Meyn and Tweedie (2012). In the next lemma, we take δ ∈ (β, 1) from
Assumption 2.7.
Lemma A.1. The operator Γ is invariant on C and Γκ 6 κ/δ.
Proof. The last claim is easy to check, since, by the definition of κ in (3), we have
Γκ =
∑
t>0
δtΓt+1πˆ = (1/δ)
∑
t>0
δt+1Γt+1πˆ 6 (1/δ)
∑
t>0
δtΓtπˆ = (1/δ)κ. (19)
Now fix u ∈ C . That Γu is κ-bounded follows from the previous inequality and the
pointwise bound |u| 6 ‖u‖κ κ. Continuity of Γu is immediate from Assumption 2.8.
Regarding monotonicity, let un = u1{u 6 n}+ n1{u > n} for each n ∈ N. Then un
is increasing for each n and also bounded, so Γun is increasing for each n.19 Moreover,
by the Monotone Convergence Theorem, Γun ↑ Γu. Since monotonicity is preserved
under pointwise limits, Γu is also increasing. Hence Γu ∈ C as claimed. 
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Pick any u ∈ C . Using (19) and πˆ 6 κ, we have
|Tu| = |π + βmax {0,Γu}| 6 πˆ + βΓ|u| 6 πˆ + β‖u‖κΓκ 6 (1 + β‖u‖κ/δ)κ.
Hence ‖Tu‖κ is finite. In addition, Tu is continuous and increasing because Tu =
π+βmax {0,Γu} and π and Γu both have these properties (by Assumptions 2.2 and
2.8). Hence T maps C into itself. In addition, T is a contraction mapping, since,
given u, v in C ,
|Tu− Tv| 6 βΓ|u− v| 6 β‖u− v‖κΓκ 6 (β/δ)‖u− v‖κκ.
Dividing both sides by κ and taking the supremum yields d(Tu, Tv) 6 (β/δ)d(u, v).
Recalling that δ > β, the claim of contractivity is established.
19By Assumption 2.3, the kernel Γ is monotone increasing. This implies that Γf is increasing
whenever f is measurable, increasing and bounded.
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To see that the fixed point v∗ is strictly increasing, pick any w ∈ C and observe that
Tw = π+ βmax{0,Γw} is strictly increasing, since Γw is increasing and π is strictly
increasing. In other words, T maps elements of C into strictly increasing functions.
Given that v∗ = Tv∗, the function v∗ must itself have these properties.
Finally, to see that v∗(ϕ, p) < 0 if ϕ = 0 or p = 0, let h(ϕ, p) :=
∑
t>1 β
t
Eϕ|π(ϕt, p)|
where {ϕt} is a productivity process starting at ϕ and generated by Γ. Clearly
v∗(ϕ, p) 6 π(ϕ, p) + h(ϕ, p). If p = 0, then π(ϕ, p) < 0 and h(ϕ, p) 6 0 by Assump-
tion 2.2. Hence v∗(ϕ, p) < 0. In addition, if ϕ = 0, then profits are negative in the
first period, by Assumption 2.2, and subsequent lifetime profits are nonpositive by
Assumption 2.6. Once again, we have v∗(ϕ, p) < 0. 
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Let Φ(p) := {ϕ > 0 | (Γv∗)(ϕ, p) > 0}. This set is nonempty
when p > 0 by v∗ > π and Assumption 2.3. Moreover, Φ(p) is closed because,
if {ϕn} ⊂ Φ(p) and ϕn → ϕ, then, by the continuity in Assumption 2.8, we have
0 6 (Γv∗)(ϕn, p) → (Γv
∗)(ϕ, p). Hence (Γv∗)(ϕ, p) > 0 and, therefore, ϕ ∈ Φ(p).
Since Φ(p) is closed and nonempty when p > 0, ϕ¯(p) = minΦ(p) exists in R+.
Due to monotonicity of v∗, the correspondence Φ is such that p 6 q implies Φ(p) ⊂
Φ(q). Hence ϕ¯(p) = minΦ(p) is decreasing. Moreover, the set Φ(p) does not contain
0 because, for any p > 0, we have Γv∗(0, p) = v∗(0, p) < 0, where the equality is by
Assumption 2.3 and the inequality is by Lemma 3.1. Hence ϕ¯(p) > 0. 
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Let e(p) :=
∫
v∗(ϕ, p)γ(dϕ)− ce. The function e is finite on R+
because v∗ 6 κ and∫
κ(ϕ, p)γ(dϕ) =
∑
t>0
δt
∫
[π(ϕ, p) + b] γ(dϕ) <∞
by Assumption 2.7. The function e is also continuous onR+. To see this, take pn → p.
Since convergent sequences are bounded, we can choose p¯ such that pn 6 p¯ for all n.
By monotonicity, it follows that v∗(ϕ′, pn) 6 v∗(ϕ′, p¯) for all ϕ′. Continuity of v∗ and
the Dominated Convergence Theorem now give e(pn) → e(p).
If p = 0, then, by Lemma 3.1, we have v∗(ϕ, p) < 0 for all ϕ, so e(p) < 0. Conversely,
if p is large enough, then
∫
π(ϕ, p)γ(dϕ) > ce by Assumption 2.5. As v∗ > π, this
implies that e(p) > 0. Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a
p > 0 such that e(p) = 0. Uniqueness now follows from strict monotonicity of e,
which in turn rests on strict monotonicity of v∗ (see Lemma 3.1). 
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Lemma A.2. For all p > 0, the transition kernel Πp is aperiodic, γ-irreducible and
admits the accessible atom ap := [0, ϕ¯(p)).
Proof. Fix ϕ ∈ R+ and let B be any Borel set such that γ(B) > 0. Let {ϕt} be
a Markov process on R+ generated by Πp and starting at ϕ0 = ϕ. Evidently, if
ϕ < ϕ¯(p), then Πp(ϕ,B) = γ(B) > 0, so B is reachable from ϕ. If instead ϕ > ϕ¯(p),
then we let m be the smallest n ∈ N such that Γn(ϕ, [0, ϕ¯(p)) > 0. By the Chapman–
Kolmogorov equations, we have
P{ϕm+1 ∈ B} =
∫
Πp(ϕ
′, B)Πmp (ϕ, dϕ
′) >
∫ ϕ¯(p)
0
Πp(ϕ
′, B)Πmp (ϕ, dϕ
′).
The right-hand side evaluates to γ(B) Γm(ϕ, [0, ϕ¯(p)), which is strictly positive by the
assumed positivity of γ(B) and the definition of m. Again B is reachable, and hence
Πp is γ-irreducible. Aperiodicity now follows from Assumption 2.4.
Finally, γ(ap) > 0 by Assumption 2.4. The interval ap is an atom because Πp(ϕ,A) =
Πp(ψ,A) = γ(A) for all ϕ, ψ < ϕ¯(p). 
Lemma A.3. For each p > 0, there exists a µ ∈ P such that (14) holds if and only
if Eτ(p) is finite.
Proof of Lemma A.3. Fix p > 0. The kernel Πp is γ-irreducible by Lemma A.2. The
set ap = [0, ϕ¯(p)) is an atom for Πp because Πp(ϕ,B) = γ(B) whenever ϕ ∈ ap.
Moreover, γ(ap) > 0 by Assumption 2.4. It now follows from Theorem 10.2.2 of
Meyn and Tweedie (2012) that Πp is positive recurrent, and hence admits a stationary
probability, if and only the expected return time to ap is finite, or Eτ(p) <∞. Note
that, in this case, we have
µ(B) = µ(ap) ·E
τ(p)∑
t=1
1{ϕt ∈ B} (20)
See Theorem 10.4.9 of Meyn and Tweedie (2012). 
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Suppose first that ℓ(p∗) =∞ and yet there exists a stationary
recursive equilibrium. Let µ∗ be the stationary productivity measure. Then µ∗ is a
finite measure invariant for Πp∗ . By the properties of this kernel in Lemma A.2 and
Theorem 10.2.2 of Meyn and Tweedie (2012), we see that Πp∗ is positive recurrent
20
and µ∗ satisfies (20). Since output q is nonnegative, this extends via the Monotone
Convergence Theorem to
∫
q(ϕ, p∗)µ∗(dϕ) = µ∗(ap∗) ·E
τ(p∗)∑
t=1
q(ϕt, p
∗) = µ∗(ap∗)ℓ(p
∗) =∞.
Here we have used the fact that µ∗(ap∗) > 0, since ap∗ is an accessible atom. But
then aggregate supply is infinite, while demand D(p∗) is finite. Contradiction.
Now suppose instead that ℓ(p∗) is finite. Observe that, by monotonicity of q and the
definition of τ(p∗), we have
τ(p∗)∑
t=1
q(ϕt, p
∗) >
τ(p∗)∑
t=1
q(ϕ¯(p∗), p∗) = τ(p∗)q(ϕ¯(p∗), p∗).
∴ τ(p∗) 6 c
τ(p∗)∑
t=1
q(ϕt, p
∗) for some c > 0.
Taking expectations gives Eτ(p∗) 6 ℓ(p∗) <∞. Hence, by Lemma A.3, the distribu-
tion µ defined in step (S2) of Section 3.3 is well defined.
Take µ∗ as given by step (S3), which is well defined by Lemma A.5. By Lemma 3.3,
the equilibrium entry condition holds at p∗ and incumbent firms maximize profits
given p∗ by existing when ϕ < ϕ∗ := ϕ¯(p∗). The goods market clears because, by
the definition of s, we have
∫
q(ϕ, p∗)µ∗(dϕ) = s
∫
q(ϕ, p∗)µ(dϕ) = D(p∗). The triple
(p∗,M∗, µ∗) satisfies time-invariance because, given any B in B,∫
Γ(ϕ,B)1{ϕ > ϕ¯(p∗)}µ∗(dϕ) +M∗γ(B)
=
∫
Γ(ϕ,B)1{ϕ > ϕ∗}µ∗(dϕ) + µ∗{ϕ < ϕ∗}γ(B)
= s
∫
[Γ(ϕ,B)1{ϕ > ϕ∗}+ 1{ϕ < ϕ∗}γ(B)]µ(dϕ).
Since µ satisfies (13), this last expression is just sµ(B), or, equivalently, µ∗(B).
We have proved that the pair (p∗, µ∗) identified by steps (S1)–(S3) yields a stationary
recursive equilibrium (SRE). The equilibrium number of entrants is M∗ = µ∗{ϕ :
ϕ < ϕ¯(p∗)}, which is positive by Lemma A.2. It is the only SRE because the time
invariance condition has at most one solution, by Lemma A.2, and the price p∗ is
uniquely determined by Lemma 3.3.
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Finally, the decomposition (10) follows from (20). Multiplying both sides by s gives
µ∗(B) = µ∗(a) ·E
τ∑
t=1
1{ϕt ∈ B}.
But µ∗(a) = µ∗{ϕ : ϕ < ϕ¯(p∗)} = M∗, which completes the proof. 
Lemma A.4. For each p > 0 and d > 0, the interval [0, d] is a petite set for Πp.
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Proof. Fix p, d > 0. It suffices to show existence of a nontrivial Borel measure ν on
R+ and an m ∈ N such that Πmp (ϕ,B) > ν(B) whenever 0 6 ϕ 6 d and B ∈ B. Let
ap := [0, ϕ¯(p)) and take the smallest n ∈ N such that ε := Γn(d, ap) > 0. (This n is
finite by Assumption 2.3.) Pick any ϕ ∈ [0, d] and B ∈ B, and let {ϕt} be generated
by Πp from initial condition ϕ. By the law of total probability,
Πn+1p (ϕ,B) = P{ϕn+1 ∈ B} > P{ϕn+1 ∈ B |ϕn ∈ ap}P{ϕn ∈ ap}.
By monotonicity of Γ and the definition of Πp, we then have
Πn+1p (ϕ,B) > γ(B)P{ϕn ∈ ap} = γ(B)Γ
n(ϕ, ap) > γ(B)Γ
n(d, ap) = γ(B)ε.
Setting ν := εγ and m := n + 1 therefore gives Πmp (ϕ,B) > ν(B), which verifies the
claim in the lemma. 
Lemma A.5. If µ ∈ P satisfies (13) and p > 0, then 0 <
∫
q(ϕ, p)µ(dϕ) <∞.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Adopting the conditions of Proposition 3.5, we first show
that Πp is V -uniformly ergodic for all p > 0 via Theorem 16.1.2 of Meyn and Tweedie
(2012). Lemma A.2 shows that Πp is irreducible and aperiodic, so we need only show
that the drift condition (V4) defined in Chapter 15 of Meyn and Tweedie (2012) is
holds with respect to a petite set. By Lemma 15.2.8 of the same reference, this will be
true whenever there exists a nonnegative function V on R+ such that the sublevel set
Ca := {ϕ ∈ R+ : V (ϕ) 6 a} is petite for each a > 0 and, for some positive constants
α < 1 and K <∞,∫
V (ϕ′)Πp(ϕ, dϕ
′) 6 αV (ϕ) +K for all ϕ > 0. (21)
Set V (ϕ) = q(ϕ, p). For this function the sublevel sets Ca are all intervals of the form
[0, d] for some d > 0 due to monotonicity of q. Such sets are petite by Lemma A.4.
20The concept of petite sets is defined in Chapter 5 of Meyn and Tweedie (2012).
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Moreover, for any fixed ϕ > 0, the definition of Πp and the drift condition for incum-
bents in (11) yields∫
V (ϕ′)Πp(ϕ, dϕ
′) 6
∫
V (ϕ′)γ(dϕ′) +
∫
V (ϕ′)Γ(ϕ, dϕ′).
The first term is finite by Assumption 2.4. The second term is bounded by (11).
Putting these bounds together yields (21) with α := λ and K :=
∫
V (ϕ′)γ(dϕ′) + L.
Next we claim that ℓ(p) is finite for this same arbitrary p. To see this, let µ be
the unique stationary distribution of Πp, existence of which is guaranteed by V -
uniform ergodicity (see Theorem 16.1.2 of Meyn and Tweedie (2012)). The term
m(p) :=
∫
q(ϕ, p)µ(dp) is finite by Proposition 4.24 of Hairer (2018), combined with
the fact that V (ϕ) := q(ϕ, p) satisfies the drift condition (21). Moreover, µ satisfies
(20), which can be expressed as µ(B) = cE
∑τ(p)
t=1 1B{ϕt} for some positive constant c.
We can extend up from indicator functions such as 1B to the nonnegative measurable
function V via the Monotone Convergence Theorem, so
∫
V (ϕ)µ(dϕ) = cE
τ(p)∑
t=1
V (ϕt) = cE
τ(p)∑
t=1
q(ϕt, p) = c · ℓ(p).
Hence m(p) :=
∫
q(ϕ, p)µ(dp) =
∫
V (ϕ)µ(dp) = c ℓ(p). Since m(p) was just shown to
be finite and c is positive, the claim is verified.
As ℓ(p) is finite for all positive p, it is finite at p∗, and hence the conclusions of
Theorem 3.4 hold. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. To begin, recall from (15) that the recursion ϕt+1 = G(ϕt,Wt+1)
reproduces the Markov dynamics for an incumbent firm embodied in Γ. If we take
{Zt} to be iid draws from γ and set
H(ϕ,w, z) := G(ϕ,w)1{ϕ > ϕ¯(p∗)}+ z1{ϕ < ϕ¯(p∗)}, (22)
then the recursion
ϕt+1 = H(ϕt,Wt+1, Zt+1) (23)
reproduces equilibrium firm dynamics corresponding to Πp∗ .
Continuing to the proof of Theorem 4.1, we make use of the implicit renewal theory
found in Corollary 2.4 of Goldie (1991). By Assumption 4.1, the distribution func-
tion of A is continuous and hence lnA is nonarithmetic. Moreover, EAα = 1 and
EAα+1 <∞, the latter of which gives EAαmax{lnA, 0} <∞. Hence A satisfies the
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conditions of Lemma 2.2 of Goldie (1991), and, as a result, we need only check that
E|H(X,W,Z)α− (AX)α| is finite for H defined in (22).21 For this it suffices to bound
expectation of the two random variables
I1 := |H(X,W,Z)
α − (AX)α|1{X < ϕ¯(p∗)} = |Zα − (AX)α| 1{X < ϕ¯(p∗)}
and
I2 := |H(X,W,Z)
α − (AX)α|1{X > ϕ¯(p∗)} 6 |G(X,W )α − (AX)α|
For I1 we can use the triangle inequality and the bound on X to obtain I1 6 Zα +
Aαϕ¯(p∗), and the expectation of the right hand side is finite by our assumptions on
A and Z. For I2, finiteness of expectation holds by the inequality on the right hand
side of the definition of I2 and Assumption 4.1. 
Lemma A.6. Under conditions (a)–(c) of Section 4, the first moment of the firm
size distribution is finite whenever α > 1.
Proof. Let {Zt} be iid draws from γ. Consider the upper bound process Ut+1 =
At+1Ut + Yt+1 + Zt+1. This dominates the equilibrium process pointwise, as can be
seen by comparing it with (22). It follows that the stationary µ of (22) is stochastically
dominated by the stationary distribution of the upper bound process whenever the
latter exists. Hence it suffices to show that the stationary solution to the upper bound
process has finite first moment.
SinceEAαt+1 = 1 and α > 1, we must haveEAt+1 < 1 (see, e.g., p. 48 of Buraczewski et al.
(2016)). Finiteness of the first moment of the stationary solution to the upper bound
process now follows from Theorem 5.1 of Vervaat (1979), provided that the additive
component Yt+1 +Zt+1 of this process has finite first moment. This is true under the
stated assumptions, so the proof of Lemma A.6 is done. 
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